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State
The broad picture that Vivek Chibber’s Locked in Place: State-Building and 
Late Industrialization in India (Chibber, 2003) paints of the trajectory of the 
developmental state in India is persuasive. Any will to install a regime able 
to discipline capital and transform the structure of production flared briefly 
and  quickly  died,  and  after  independence domestic  capitalists,  never 
committed to an industrial planning regime with teeth, called the shots in 
an  import-substituting  regime in  which  they  enjoyed rich  pickings but 
suffered few constraints. As the core planning agency lacked the ability to 
command other areas of government, ministries disregarded plan objectives 
and issued licences indiscriminately, rendering the whole planning regime 
incoherent.  Once  embedded, moreover,  the  system developed its  own 
momentum, and efforts to reform it failed. Chibber’s account is far from 
conclusive – although he introduces valuable archival material, he tells us 
virtually  nothing about the initial structure and subsequent evolution of 
production, finance and trade, and he offers the briefest of sketches of the 
‘Indian political class’ and the ‘Indian capitalist class’. Even so, I can readily 
accept that India’s post-independence industrial planning and policy regime 
was  ineffective,  and  institutionally  embedded  in  a  way  that  made  it 
resistant to reform; and that India’s capitalists rather liked it that way.
However, his critique of India’s planners and capitalists is far from radical, 
and more neoliberal than Marxist in inspiration. Its focus on class revolves 
around the capacity of the state to build the kind of alliance with business 
that  will  secure  capitalist  development,  rather  than  with  the  political 
economy  of  production  and  exploitation.  And,  I  shall  argue,  his 
endorsement  of  a  conventional  neoclassical  understanding  of  capitalist 
competition, coupled with his downbeat appraisal of the potential for the 
‘developmental  state’  today, brings him exactly  into line with  the post-
Washington Consensus World Bank. In all of this, it is his adoption of the 
Korean developmental state as a point of reference, and his interpretation 
of it, that sets the terms of the analysis. 
Embracing Korea
Chibber  fails  to  grasp  the  logic  or  the  dynamics  of  the  Korean 
developmental  state.  First, he is entirely uncritical – Korea is presented 
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without qualification as the success story that contrasts with India’s failure. 
Second, he takes no account of Korea’s repressive labour regime, thereby 
making it impossible to understand the ‘capitalist developmental state’ or 
the alliance between the state and business. Third, his own explanation for 
the installation of the developmental state is perverse and unconvincing. 
An ‘exemplar’ developmental state
Chibber  describes  Korea  unequivocally  at  the  outset  as  ‘perhaps  the 
exemplar developmental state in the postwar period’: whereas in India ‘the 
state’s efforts to promote a dynamic industrial sector fell prey to the twin 
evils of bureaucratic paralysis and capitalist rent-seeking, Korean efforts 
were rewarded by unprecedented success’ [4]. There is no hint here that 
the Korean state itself fell prey to ‘bureaucratic paralysis’ or ‘capitalist rent-
seeking’ in due course: indeed, the closing section of the introduction raises 
the issue of the reproduction of the developmental state exclusively with 
reference to the failure of reform in India in the 1960s.1 As a result,  a 
fundamental imbalance is built into the analytical framework of the study.
Following Amsden and others, Chibber attributes the ‘enormous success of 
Korea in making its traversal to a dynamic and efficient industrial economy’ 
[5] to ‘highly interventionist industrial planning’:
The Korean and Taiwanese states had actively manipulated trade and 
exchange rates, the allocation of finance, as well as the price structure 
of the domestic economy; . . both countries not only had developed a 
large public enterprise sector but had also been active in directing the 
structure of private investment [6].
While  cultural,  institutional,  economic,  geographical  and  other  factors 
played their part, he argues, the state made a significant contribution by 
virtue of its  capacity, a combination of ‘cohesiveness as a strategic actor’ 
and the ability to ‘extract performance from private firms’ [7]. The Korean 
state, in sum, had ‘the appropriate institutional backbone’ [8] to install a 
developmental  regime.  Chibber  adds  to  this  standard  account  ‘a  new 
interpretation of the relevant period in Korean history’: first, it succeeded in 
striking ‘an alliance of sorts’ with its domestic business class’ [9]. Second, 
there was a ‘deeper, structural factor’ that explained the contrast:
1 Chang (1998), a source Chibber cites approvingly, gives ample evidence of the 
vicissitudes of the Korean developmental state from the 1980s onwards. See also 
Chang, Park and Yoo (2001) and Pirie (2005).
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In India the state opted for import-substituting industrialization (ISI), 
whereas in Korea greater emphasis was placed on export-led 
industrialization (ELI). I suggest that the two models generated 
different political incentive structures for the capitalist classes: ISI 
made it possible, and even rational, for Indian capitalists to resist the 
effort to build a state that could impose discipline in private firms; ELI, 
on the other hand, made it rational for Korean business to acquiesce to 
its own disciplining by a developmental state [10].  
These two points provide the first two of four ‘theses’ set out in Chapter 
Two [29, 32]. The third adds that ‘Korea was able to switch from ISI to ELI 
because certain  conditions virtually  unique in  the  world economy  were 
available to Korea, conditions that simply were not available to other LDCs’ 
[39]. These arose from the fact that ‘Japanese firms were vacating markets 
in the United States and bequeathing them to Korean firms, along with their 
marketing  and  sales  outlets’  [42].  This,  then,  is  Chibber’s  Korea:  a 
developmental state which enjoys success because it forms an alliance with 
a domestic capitalist class willing to accept disciplinary planning as a step 
towards  export-led industrialization made possible by the  ceding of  US 
markets and associated marketing and sales outlets by Japanese firms. 
The absence of the working class
It has never occurred to anyone before, least of all anyone attempting a 
class  analysis  of  the  developmental  state,  to  ignore the  labour regime 
inaugurated under Japanese rule and perfected under Park. Yet Chibber 
glosses entirely over this central feature of the Korean developmental state 
– the repressive regime instituted after  1961 through which labour was 
politically  excluded,  policed  by  the  intelligence  services,  faced  with 
intimidation and physical repression, and subjected to unparalleled levels of 
exploitation in the workplace. The squeezing of a new proletariat out of the 
countryside,  the  corralling  of  mostly  female  workers  in  dormitories 
alongside sites of production, the regime of exceptionally long working days 
and limited holidays  and  the  enormous differentials  between male  and 
female wages are massively documented, yet play no part in his analysis.2 
2 Among sources Chibber himself uses, see Amsden, 1990, pp. 13-14; among 
those he does not, see Deyo, 1987, passim. Deyo (p. 191) states the obvious: 
‘Labor discipline has been an important prerequisite for a development 
strategy that centers on manufacturing for world markets’. Neglect of this 
factor contributes to Chibber’s refusal to accept the relevance of the Japanese 
colonial legacy. As Cumings remarks: ‘In the postwar period Japan was shorn 
of a few features of its 1930s political economy. But in Taiwan and, later, in 
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This removes at a stroke the most powerful explanation for the alliance 
between the  developmental  state  and  a  fledgling  domestic bourgeoisie 
weakly placed to exert hegemony for itself. One should not have to point 
out that the East Asian developmental state was pre-eminently a capitalist 
developmental  state,  and  a  central  part  of  that  was  its  creation and 
disciplining of an exploitable proletariat. 
Once the class strategy of the developmental state is split down the middle, 
and one half is discarded, it is inevitable that ‘the secret’ of the alliance 
between the state and the domestic bourgeoisie will prove elusive. Eloquent 
testimony to this is provided by the glaring contradiction embedded in the 
last of the four theses which shape the study:
A full explanation for why the Indian National Congress was 
unsuccessful in installing a developmental state is that, in addition to 
facing a mobilized business class set against the project, Party leaders 
also demobilized a massive and quite organized labour movement – 
thus reducing the state’s leverage against the capitalist class [43].
As it happens, this argument is entirely unconvincing. In Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico,  and France alike, governments favouring capitalist development 
sought to break the back of autonomous labour movements and create new 
federations controlled by the state and willing to sign up to its project. The 
implication that  the continuation of  a  powerful and independent  labour 
movement in India not subordinated to a state developmental project would 
have  helped  to  win  the  business  class  over  is  absurd.  The  glaring 
contradiction here, though, is that Chibber does not apply the same thesis 
to the Korean case. Unable to resort to the argument that the installation of 
the developmental state required an alliance between the state and labour, 
he suggests instead that it was the alliance with  business that gave the 
Korean state the autonomy to carry its project forward: ‘it was the success 
in striking an alliance of sorts with its  domestic business class [emphasis 
mine] that gave the Korean political elite the space to build appropriate 
South Korea the 1930s model reappeared, in nearly all its aspects, including 
militarization and harsh repression of labor’ (1987, pp. 58-59). Indeed, labour 
repression is the only social legacy of Japanese colonialism to which Haggard, 
Kang and Moon (1997, p. 868) will admit.  If there was ever a case of 
consensus, this is it.  Curiously, in one of the rare instances where Marx is 
cited, it is in connection with the ‘bloody legislation against the expropriated’ 
that attended the process of primitive accumulation, or the creation of fully 
commodified labour markets [14]. But Chibber never relates the thought to 
the Korean case.
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institutions’; although not  sufficient in  itself,  ‘the  antecedent  autonomy 
garnered by the alliance with business was necessary for the state-level 
processes to be effective’ [9-10]. In this regard, then, Chibber’s analytical 
framework is entirely incoherent.3
Chibber’s ‘new interpretation’
While  dismissing neoliberal  accounts of  Korea’s  success, Chibber takes 
strenuous issue with ‘statist’ versions too, on the grounds that most of the 
literature ‘has assumed that the project of state building was successful 
because the state was simply dominant over its industrial class’ [31; see 
also 51-52]. He places particular weight on two sources from 1980: Jones 
and Sakong, who claim that ‘the dominant partner  is  unequivocally  the 
government’,  and  that  ‘the  government’s  wishes  are  tantamount  to 
commands, and business dare not take them lightly’; and Mason et al., 
whose view is that ‘it is the government that is the Chairman of the Board, 
with business holding a few of the directorships’. Chang is subsequently 
taken to task for suggesting, ‘in his otherwise excellent article on Korean 
industrial  policy’,  that  ‘the  business community  were  like  “criminals  on 
parole on condition that they ‘serve the nation through enterprise’ and, 
economically, a paper tiger with little power to make investment decisions – 
the  ultimate  capitalist  prerogative”’.4  A  couple  more  sources  are 
mentioned, and on this basis Chibber finds a ‘developing consensus’ that 
the state was dominant over the capitalist class. This limited recourse to 
direct citation is supported by scattered references to the state’s supposed 
‘unquestioned power over capitalists’, or ‘inordinate power over capitalists’ 
[53], and by some strong formulations of Chibber’s own:
3 There is another aspect to Chibber’s identification of Korea as the ‘exemplar 
developmental state’ that distorts his analysis. He argues in relation to India’s 
failure to introduce an effective developmental state that if a charge of 
teleology is to be avoided, ‘it must be shown that the institutions in question – 
which were not, in the end, installed – were in fact, on the political agenda at 
some critical juncture’; then goes on to say that ‘The years immediately 
following Independence, 1947 to 1951, constituted just this kind of critical 
juncture, in which a strong developmental state was very much on the political 
agenda’ [8-9]. But it was the Soviet Union that was the ‘exemplar 
developmental state’ of the time – and Chibber’s failure to mention this gives 
a surreal quality to the discussion. He assumes far too lightly that the 
commitment of the Indian political class was unambiguously towards capitalist 
development, and recognised as such by the ‘business class’.
4 The references to Jones and Sakong (1980, p. 67) and Mason et al. (1980, p. 
263) appear at p. 54; Chang (1993, p. 152) is cited on p. 61.
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The developing consensus is thus statist in substance: industrial policy 
was successful because of the unique power the state had to override 
the proclivities of its own capitalist class, and it was this power that set 
Korea apart from other developing states [52].
Where I part company . . . is on the matter of whether the reforms in 
question were capable of securing a general dominance of the state 
over the business community, so that the state could impose its own 
agenda on the class, regardless of the latter’s own perception of its 
interests [58].
It is one thing to say that the state initiates a new set of policies for 
future growth; it is quite another to insist that it can successfully 
impose them on its business class, regardless of the latter’s 
preferences [62].
What are we to make of this? First, Chibber is guilty of a slippery use of 
language. He does not discriminate consistently between a ‘weak’ statist 
argument that the state was the senior partner and business the junior, and 
the ‘strong’ version in which the state simply imposes its preferences. This 
allows him ample opportunity, frequently taken, to affect to differ where in 
fact he agrees. And he is happy enough to declare that ‘the state had an 
uncommon capacity to exert influence over its business class’ [51], and 
even to use formulations which suggest that he even thinks the ‘strong’ 
thesis is sometimes applicable: on the early arrest and release of leading 
businessmen, for  example,  he  comments:  ‘At  one  stroke,  Park  thus 
demonstrated that the junta held no brief against private property, while at 
the same time maintaining its dominance over the propertied class’ [61]. 
Second,  a  number  of  leading  scholars  are  not identified  with  this 
‘developing consensus’. Neither Cumings nor Johnson are, and he confesses 
himself unable to fathom the views of either Amsden or Wade – either when 
an earlier version of this chapter appeared in Politics & Society in 1999, or 
in the current text.5 This seems to be a consensus that excludes the leading 
authorities on the topic.
Third, he  does not  at  any point challenge (or  for  the  most part  even 
address) the  evidence adduced by supposed  proponents  of  the  ‘statist’ 
thesis. Instead, he contents himself with generalities. This is well illustrated 
in relation to the argument singled out as ‘the main theoretical pillar on 
which the claim of dominance rests’ – the state’s control of finance [58]. 
5  See Chibber (1999), p. 339, note 9; and the (virtually) identical note here at 
p. 267.
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Chibber’s opening statement here is categorical:
There is no reason to think that the control of banks gives the state 
sufficient power to unilaterally set the agenda, in the form of a 
particular accumulation model. Capitalists have a countervailing power 
of their own, through their control over final investment. Statists 
provide no argument as to how the state can be immune to this power, 
even if it does enjoy financial hegemony [58].
On this basis, he proposes a reformulation:  the state cannot  coercively 
impose new conditions onto the entire class, but control of finance may give 
it ‘an effective stick to wield against particular firms within the class’ [58]. 
All well and good. But his point of reference appears to be some generic 
capitalist state with a fully constituted capitalist class with its own resources 
to invest [see in particular 63-64]. In contrast, the whole point of Chang’s 
reference to  the  power to  make  investment  decisions as  the  ‘ultimate 
capitalist  prerogative’  was to  highlight  the  exceptional character  of  the 
Korean regime, and it is this that needs to explored, to be either confirmed 
or rebutted. After all,  the particular  weakness of the domestic capitalist 
class in Korea is a constant point of reference in the literature, and Chibber 
accepts one of its most extreme formulations – the critique of Kohli by 
Haggard, Kang and Moon which argues that virtually nothing remained of 
Korea’s industrial base by the mid-1950s. In their view, it was variously lost 
because of the division of Korea (in the case of most heavy industry), or in 
ruins by the time the Japanese departed (‘The most important point to 
make about Japan’s efforts at industrializing Korea . . is that they did not 
survive’),  or  destroyed in  the Korean War.  And they  single  out as  the 
leading actors in its renaissance the chaebol created in the ISI period and 
lavishly supported by Syngmann Rhee – precisely those  particular firms 
that were disciplined by Park.6 One could explore the empirical evidence 
further. Instead, I invite Chibber to tell us more about those elements of 
the Korean capitalist class in the 1960s, outside the  particular firms who 
were disciplined, that had their own resources to invest in the period, and 
did so (or refused to do so) either in defiance of the state or without its 
support. Where, in other words, are the ‘large swathes of the entire class’ 
[52]  beyond  these  ‘particular  firms  within  the  class’?  Where  is  the 
6 See Haggard, Kang and Moon (1997), especially pp. 872 and 875-6. They cite 
data from Kim (1997) in support of their argument, while Chibber, in contrast, 
quotes Kim out of context as evidence of the ‘statist consensus’ and ignores 
his data.
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‘countervailing power of capital’ when the state is the direct source of the 
capital, or the sole gateway to it? On the evidence, it emerged in Korea only 
from the late 1980s onwards as government controls began to fall away.7 
And Chibber himself remarks, at a different point in the text, that ‘at least 
in  manufacturing,  the  Chaebols  were the  economy’  [169].  If  so,  the 
distinction he makes is meaningless for the Korean case.
Fourth, the singling out of finance in any case caricatures the ‘statist’ case. 
While the importance of state control  of finance has rightly been widely 
noted, it  is  one of  many  massively  documented factors underlying the 
unusual leverage the Korean developmental state held over the ‘capitalist 
class’, many of which Chibber himself describes. Yet Chibber, caught in the 
trap of arguing from the general  to the particular, ends by denying the 
exceptional character of the Korean state altogether:
This is not to deny that the state wielded considerable power over 
domestic business; but all capitalist states have such power to varying 
degrees. The statists do not present any compelling reason to believe 
that such power was qualitatively greater in Korea than elsewhere 
[52].
Apart from the fact that the state provided 57.9 per cent of finance capital 
between 1962 and 1985, that is; and that Korean firms were the most 
highly leveraged in the world; and that tight restrictions kept foreign direct 
investment very low, and controlled by the state;8 and that the Foreign 
Exchange Concentration System and the Foreign Exchange Management Act 
between them denied capitalists the right to dispose freely of their export 
earnings; and that domestic consumption was severely repressed, which 
denied capitalists easy opportunities to make profits in the home market; 
and that mergers or reallocation of production lines were imposed by the 
state in order to avoid ‘excessive competition’, as were entry restrictions 
and regulations on capacity expansion, enforceable by fines and prison 
sentences, and liquidations, nationalizations and sales to remove inefficient 
7 Chang, Park and Yoo (2001) describe in some detail how Korea lost its ability 
to dictate patterns of investment from this point in time. This spelt the 
unravelling of the exceptional character of the regime. Pirie (2005) brings the 
story up to date.
8  Chang, 1993. Chang also draws attention to the Park regime’s emulation of 
Japanese corporatism, its obsession with capital accumulation, and the value it 
attached to heavy and chemical industries.  
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producers.9 Apart  from,  that  is,  the  creation  of  a  state-orchestrated 
domestic economy oriented by a Schumpeterian rather than a neo-classical 
view of competition, in which the chaebol were dependent on state-created 
rents and driven to compete against each other for recognition by the state. 
As  if  this  were  not  enough, Chibber  himself  mentions a  host  of  other 
factors, all familiar from the literature: the nationalization of the banks [52, 
60]; the authority of the Economic Planning Board [52]; the ‘thoroughly 
clientelistic’  nature  of  the  state’s  relation  to  Korean  business  under 
Syngmann Rhee [56]; the initial imprisonment of the biggest industrialists 
[57, 60-61]; Park’s selective removal of corrupt bureaucrats, pursued ‘not 
to eliminate corruption but to confine it strategically so that it would serve 
the  political  ends  of  the  regime,  without  interfering  with  its  economic 
strategy’ [59]; Park’s ‘political will’ [64] – a factor not as easily separated 
as Chibber assumes from ‘some unique capacity of the Korean state’; the 
regime’s  alliance  with  farmers  and  small  business,  the  former  made 
possible by the earlier land reform but cemented by the forgiveness of rural 
debt [68]; Park’s further tightening of his grip on power in 1963-4, through 
the reshaping of the planning regime and the holding of elections [69-70]; 
the lucrative contracts controlled by the state as a consequence of US aid 
spending and military procurement, the latter particularly in relation to the 
Vietnam War [70]; the effectiveness of the regime’s monitoring of exports 
and its punishment of failure [71 and ft. 53, p. 271]; the use of the Korean 
Traders Association and similar sectoral associations as compulsory, state-
controlled disciplinary devices [156, 168-9], and the fact that the contact 
between Korean and Japanese ‘business’ on which such weight is placed 
was actually channelled through Park and his former military instructor, 
Yukawa – a detail that implausibly appears without comment in a passage 
aimed to demonstrate that the strategy was ‘pushed by business itself’ [74-
75, 82]. There are perhaps the rudiments here, after all,  of a case for 
Korean exceptionalism.
Fifth,  Chibber  turns  out  anyway  to  grossly  misrepresent  the  supposed 
‘statism’ of his principal sources. To make the point briefly, we need only 
consider the following, quoted by Johnson from Mason et al:
9  ‘What is notable in the conduct of such ‘reorganisation’ programmes is that 
even the economically and politically powerful conglomerates, chaebols, as 
individual conglomerates, were not immune to state discipline, although, as a 
group, they were certainly privileged in their access to various rents’ (Chang, 
1993, p. 149). 
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The rapid economic growth that began in the early 1960s and has 
accelerated since then has been a government-directed development 
in which the principal engine has been private enterprise. The 
relationship between a government committed to a central direction of 
economic development and a highly dynamic private sector that 
confronts the planning machinery with a continually changing structure 
of economic activities presents a set of interconnections difficult to 
penetrate and describe. Planning in South Korea, if it is interpreted to 
include not only policy formulation but also the techniques of policy 
implementation, is substantially more than “indicative.” The hand of 
government reaches down rather far into the activities of individual 
firms with its manipulation of incentives and disincentives. At the same 
time, the situation can in no sense be described in terms of a 
command economy.10
Far from claiming that the state could impose its own agenda on the class 
regardless of its preferences, Mason et al. appear to categorically deny it.
Sixth  and  last,  Chibber’s  manoeuvre  has  been  anticipated.  Chalmers 
Johnson again:
Ever since the catchphrase “Japan, Inc” was invented to refer to the 
Japanese government-business relationship, writers on the subject 
have found it de rigueur to misinterpret it to mean Japanese 
government domination of the economy and then to demolish it. But 
Taira’s enigma, with regard to Japan or the role of government in 
Korea and Taiwan, does not imply domination; it refers explicitly to the 
coexistence of authoritarianism and capitalism – and that must be 
explained.11
Precisely so. Chibber is so caught up with an imaginary dispute over ‘state 
domination’ that he forgets that the Korean developmental state was an 
authoritarian capitalist project through and through. In missing this, as we 
have seen, he misses both the link to Japanese colonial rule (to which Park 
himself was a living monument), and the roots of the repressive labour 
regime. This is of a piece with his refusal to believe that control of finance 
by the state (and the many other mechanisms identified in the literature) 
could give it a hold over the capitalist class. It betokens a comprehensive 
failure to grasp the logic of the Korean model of development, or in other 
10  Mason et al. (1980), p. 254, cited in Johnson (1987), p. 141. Compare Park 
himself: ‘The economic planning or long-range development program must not 
be allowed to stifle creativity or spontaneity of private enterprise’ (quoted in 
Amsden, 1989, p. 50).
11 Johnson (1987), p. 140. [Koji] Taira’s enigma (quoted ibid., p. 137) is as 
follows: ‘The combination of an absolutist state with a capitalist economy from 
1889 to 1947 has been an enigma, far from fully unravelled, among scholars 
interested in Japanese economic history’.   
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words the political economy of the Korean capitalist developmental state. 
The same is true, of course, of his clinching argument – the issue of access 
to  US markets for  light  manufactured goods as an explanation for  the 
successful installation of an export-led regime. Chang provides the response 
here, in an excellent point Chibber was ill-advised to ignore:
The Korean success was based on a conception of economic 
development which encompassed far more than mere trade strategy. 
Development strategy is a multidimensional problem involving such 
wide-ranging areas as the establishment of long-term targets for 
growth and structural change, investment in productive facilities and 
infrastructure, the supply of an adequate labour force with industrial 
competence and discipline, and technological catching-up and 
development. Development strategy should no longer be discussed in 
terms of the misconceived dichotomy between export-led (or outward-
looking) and import-substituting (or inward-looking) strategies.12
In Korea after 1961, import-substituting and export-oriented activities alike 
were characterized by ‘the pursuit of long-term dynamic efficiency through 
the state’s constant creation of  rents’.13 It  makes no sense to contrast 
‘inefficient’  import  substitution  with  ‘efficient’  export  promotion.  Light 
manufactures played their part. But the principal focus of the disciplinary 
developmental state was on massive exercises in import substitution which 
would only pay off in terms of new exports from heavy industry in the 
1970s. Import substitution as much as export promotion was fundamentally 
characterized by the search for productivity and competitive advantage, as 
indeed was production in state-owned enterprises. This, after all, is what 
Asia’s  Next  Giant was  all  about.14 By  ignoring all  this,  then  conflating 
planning,  the  disciplinary  regime  and  the  ‘turn  to  export-led 
industrialization’ in 1965, Chibber ends up in an absurdity – attributing to a 
cause located in 1965 the capitalists’ acceptance of the installation of a 
disciplinary regime in 1961.
12 Chang, 1993, p. 153.
13 Ibid.
14 Amsden, 1989, esp. chs. 10-12 on nonlinear diversification, steel and ship-
building. The distinction between ISI and ELI is rather artificial in the Korean 
context. But Chibber seems never to have compared import substitution after 
1965 with export promotion. Was the former less efficient? Note Amsden 
again: ‘Although exports were encouraged, steel was primarily an import-
substitution industry’ (p. 316). It matched Japanese levels of efficiency.
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Endorsing Capitalism
How has Chibber come to be in such a tangle? And why does it matter so 
much? He comes to the Korean case with a set of assumptions drawn from 
institutionalist debates on ‘Western’ capitalism (whether in developing and 
developed countries). These accounts (whether on the welfare state or on 
import-substituting regimes in Latin America) typically pay little attention to 
class  struggle, or  to  the  links  between exploitation,  accumulation,  and 
legitimation. And although the ghosts of  ‘neo-Marxist’ debates from the 
1970s hover over Chibber’s account, they manifest themselves only in an 
attenuated form, in the argument that the state cannot act directly against 
capitalist  interests. However,  by  reducing the  latter  to  the interests  of 
actually existing capitalists, Chibber falls into an instrumentalist trap; and 
he compounds the error, as we have seen, by imagining such an actually 
existing capitalist class in Korea, independent of the state in the sense that 
it has its own accumulation model already in place. One consequence of this 
is that he cannot grasp the logic of the capitalist developmental state in 
Korea. 
A more serious consequence, in terms of the general implications of the 
study, is that both the general analytical framework and its application to 
India end up reproducing the neoliberal critique of state intervention. This is 
inherent in Chibber’s general argument regarding the contrasted logics and 
political  incentive  structures  of  import-substituting  and  export-led 
industrialization, where the former is  characterized by inefficiency, rent-
seeking and the ‘attenuation of competitive pressures’ [34], while the latter 
reflects  not  a  commitment  to  free  trade  so  much  as  the  pursuit  of 
competitiveness in the global capitalist economy:
Unlike the case of ISI, where investment plans of local firms were 
shaped by the easy opportunities of the domestic market, firms in ELI 
had to adapt to the rigors of international competition. And from this 
difference in economic challenges came the difference in political 
incentive structures [36].
I do not think we are in Korea any more. The general argument is dubious, 
as the state can as easily subsidise exports as import substitutes. In Korea, 
where import substitution fed directly into the export effort, rather than into 
‘easy  opportunities’  in  the  domestic  market,  it  makes no sense at  all. 
Behind  Chibber’s  contrast  between  import-substituting  and  export-led 
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industrialization  respectively  there  lurks  something  else:  an  uncritical 
acceptance of the neoclassical view of competition as an unqualified good, 
and of the folly of seeking to buck the market. His account of Korea is 
completely distorted by this logic, and his account of India entirely shaped 
by it.
Falling into the Arms of the World Bank (and the IMF)
Chibber concedes at the very beginning of the study that ‘the era of full-
blown dirigisme may be over’, suggesting at the same time that ‘it is far 
from clear that some kind of state intervention at the sectoral or firm level 
is  also a  thing of  the past’  [x].  His more general  stand,  which follows 
Johnson in every respect, is that the developmental state requires not just 
an  efficient  bureaucracy,  but  a  nodal  agency  with  the  authority  to 
coordinate policy [21]. In itself, of course, this is not a radical argument. 
One might charge a ‘nodal agency’ – say, for example, the Finance Ministry 
–  with  ensuring  sound  macroeconomic policy  and  coordinating  micro-
economic strategies to enforce a regime of competition across all  policy 
areas, as the World Bank does today. And indeed, at the end of the book 
Chibber argues as follows:
In today's intellectual and political climate, in India and without, there 
is a sense that the era of state intervention in development is at an 
end. And certainly, as one witnesses the old scaffolding of the "licence-
permit raj" being dismantled, it is possible to feel the momentum 
toward freer markets as something of an inexorable force. But to take 
this shift as the death knell of the state is to miss the essential lessons 
of Marx and Polanyi – the choice is over how to have the state 
intervene in the economy, not whether to have it intervene. Certainly, 
if the arguments developed here are any guide, the increasing 
emphasis the state is placing on exports is most likely to occasion a 
closer relationship between the state and exporting firms. More 
generally, there is good reason to expect that a liberalization of 
markets will lead not to less regulation but rather to a different regime 
of regulation – which can be more dense than the one preceding it. If 
this is the case, then the worries that animate this study – those of 
state capacity, internal cohesiveness, and its autonomy from social 
groups – remain of considerable interest. The turn away from a state-
led development strategy will change the state's role, not erase it; 
whether the institutional capacities required for this new role in fact 
come about depends, as always, on politics [243].
Very well, but what kind of state does this suggest? The state dear to the 
World Bank, and specifically the Polanyi-inspired Wolfensohn-Stiglitz World 
Bank,  with its  own version of the East Asian developmental  experience 
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incorporated  into  its  endorsement  of  the  actively  interventionist  state 
promoting market-friendly development.15 Chibber is at one with the Bank’s 
2005  World  Development  Report,  A  Better  Investment  Climate  for 
Everyone, which even addresses, albeit with caution, the circumstances in 
which selective state intervention might be appropriate.16 Not only that, but 
Raghuram Rajam, Economic Counsellor and Director of the IMF Research 
Department  addressed the  continuing ‘closed’ character  of  India in  the 
following terms in New Delhi early in January 2005:
One explanation is the lack of confidence of our entrepreneurs. Till 
recently, our entrepreneurs, shielded by protection against domestic 
and foreign entry, felt they simply could not compete against foreign 
firms. Protection not only renders the beneficiaries lazy and inefficient, 
it also gives them less incentive to rectify distortions and inefficiencies 
in the system. Our corporations could not care less that finance was so 
costly during the License Permit Raj for the costs could be passed on 
to consumers. But when talk turned to liberalization, they argued they 
could not compete against foreigners who had access to much cheaper 
finance. And they are not unique in such complaints. An analysis of 
attitudes towards competition across the world shows that 
entrepreneurs are far more likely to oppose liberalization when their 
financial system is relatively underdeveloped.17 
This is precisely where Chibber’s analytical framework leads. He gives 
himself no stopping point short of an uncritical acceptance of competition as 
the lodestar of the developmental state.
15 See Cammack 2003, 2004. The reinvention of Marx as a patron saint of state 
intervention in this cause is an index of Chibber’s theoretical affiliations. 
16 World Bank, 2004, Ch. 8. This is not all that surprising. Consider for example 
Johnson (1987, p. 140) on the logic of the capitalist development state: the 
elite’s ‘primary leadership task is to discover how, organizationally, to make its 
own developmental goals compatible with the market mechanism (that is, with 
such things as prices that are real measures of value, private property in 
theory and in practice, and decentralized decision-making). . .  [T]he truly 
successful ones understand that they need the market to maintain efficiency, 
motivate the people over the long term, and serve as a check on 
institutionalized corruption while they are battling against underdevelopment’; 
or even Amsden (1989, p. 18): ‘The creation of competitiveness on the basis 
of an abundant, relatively well-educated labor supply is the key difference of 
latter-day twentieth-century learning’.
17  ‘India – A Hub for Globalization’, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/010705.htm, accessed 11 
January 2005.
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